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Abstract
Traditionally, Dynamic Scoring calculations experiements are carried out using represen-
tative agent based macroeconomic models. Existing literature does not provide any objection
to this approach. In this paper, I develop a heterogeneous agent model similar to the Saver-
Spenders model of Mankiw(2000). But spenders in my model are merely credit constrained
and not Rule of thumb consumers. Both groups are intertemporal optimizers because of
the existence of Internal Habit Persistence. Transition path of most of the macro and scal
variables for various tax cuts under alternative nancing scheme shows pattern which are
signicantly di¤erent and sometimes contrasting to the representative agent model. Dynamic
scoring calculations reveal a downward bias of the representative agent model. Underestima-
tion of the dynamic response could be as large as 45%. Finally, steady state results indicate
smaller impact of contractionary policies on major scal variables such as net tax revenue and
tax base. Over all, the paper argues that the need to use heterogeneous agent based model
in dynamic scal calculations is not only desirable but also essential.
Key Words: Savers-spenders model, rule-of thumb consumer, intertemporal optimizers,
dynamic scoring, habit persistence, alternative nancing, debt nancing, scal policy
JEL code: E62, H2, H3, H6
1 Introduction
Should we use heterogeneous agent based model to analyze aggregate change rather than repre-
sentative agent based model? More precisely, should we use models that have rich heterogeneity
across their agents in terms of market participation, preference and labor supply decisions to
analyze policy experiments such as dynamic scoring that focus on the aggregate implications of
alternative scal policies? The conventional wisdom among policy making agencies and to some
extent, in the literature is the following; although heterogeneous agent based models are crucial
for analyzing distributional policies, for standard dynamic scal policy analysis where the main
focus is the aggregate e¤ect such as debt nancing and dynamic scoring, the representative agent
based model, although subject to minor measurement error, could provide a reasonable approx-
imation to macroeconomic response to various policy changes, and therefore could be used as
I would like to thank my Advisor , Eric Leeper, for his valuable suggesstions during my research. I would
like to specially thank Nora Traum for her valuable comments and also for sharing matlab codes for Leeper and
Yang(2006). I would also like to thank Susan Yang for providing code for the steady state calculations of Leeper
and Yang(2006) and helping me to understand the fundamentals of dynamic scoring. Finally, I thank all the
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1
a benchmark without any discretion. This paper attempts to refute this conventional wisdom
and tries to answer these questions by adopting a heterogenous agent based general equilibrium
model to carry out one scal policy experiments. The experiment is known as the Dynamic
scoring exercise undertaken by Joint Committee of Taxation(with the support from the Con-
gressional Budget O¢ ce) . I systematically employ di¤erent layers of heterogeneity to the model
to highlight the importance of various kinds of heterogeneity. The paper consistently show that
heterogeneity can be very important not only for the distributional consequences but also for the
aggregate implications. While most of the existing literature either puts less importance on the
degree of heterogeneity or most of the times completely ignores it by using representative agent
base models, this paper argues that using representative agent based model for dynamic scoring
in general could be seriously misleading. This could lead to conclusions which are qualitatively
and quantitatively di¤erent from a heterogeneous agent-based models predictions.
2 Dynamic Fiscal Policy and Economic Modelling
Dynamic scoring is the analysis of changes in tax revenue as a result of a proposed tax change
by incorporating dynamic macroeconomic e¤ects. It is therefore, an analysis of dynamic scal
policy. There is a large group of papers that analyze the e¤ect of scal policy in a the frame-
work of a representative agent based model. These papers focus on the aggregate implications
of the economy and bypass the analysis of the distributional e¤ect of the scal policy. This
large group includes, but not limited to, fundamental contributions from Baxter and King(1993),
King and Rebelo(2002), King and Rebelo(1990), McGrattan(1994) Leeper and Yang(2006) and
important contributions from Trabandt and Uhlig(2005), Gordon and Leeper(2005), Novales and
Ruiz(2002). But recently, there has been exciting new development of a class of models that
retain the tractable nature of the representative agent model while introduce some degree of
heterogeneity across agents which enable them to provide limited but important insight into the
distributional/ disaggregate e¤ect of scal policy. Papers from this new and rapidly increasing
pool includes Mankiw(2000), Mankiw and Weinzierl(2006), Gali, Salido and Valles(2004.a,JMCB
and 2004.b), Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust(2005), Forni,Monforte and Sessa(2006), Colciago(2007)
and Yang(2007). All these papers use a new kind of heterogenous agent based model rst pio-
neered by Campbell and Makiw(1989). In this model, there are two kinds of agents. The rst
groups are called the savers who have access to the credit market/or actually save by partici-
pating in the credit market. The second groups are called the spenders who do not have any
access to the credit market/or does not save. Therefore, this model has a unique combination
of agents who follow life cycle hypothesis(savers) and agents who do not. This model draws
support from several important empirical papers. First, Porteba(1988) found that anticipated
tax change did not change consumption of some people. This, his argued, was an evidence of
the Violation of LCH/PIH. Wol¤(1998, 2001) looked at the Survey of credit nance data and
found that almost 40% of the people surveyed had zero/negative wealth. Finally, Shapiro and
Slemrod(1995) asked what people will do with the extra money from Bushs 1992 tax cut. 43%
said they would spend the entire money. All these ndings suggest that a hybrid model such
as the Campbell and Mankiw(1989) would be a better approximation of the reality and could
be used for more accurate policy analysis. Many empirical papers(Forni, Monforte, and Sessa
(2006), Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust(2005)) have used this model to carry econometric works and
found success.
Outside the academic work, policy institutions such as the Joint Committee of Taxation and
the Congressional Budget O¢ ce carry out analysis of dynamic scal policy. Surprisingly, in
almost all instances, their modeling choice involves using representative agent based models or
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simple overlapping generations models that only capture Intergenerational heterogeneity1. Papers
that are aligned with policy institutions also use representative agent based models(for example,
Mankiw and Weinzierl(2006), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999)).
The use of simple representative agent based modeling for important scal policy analysis
has raised concern among academics and policy makers. It is strongly argued that the aggregate
predictions from disaggregate heterogenous based models are di¤erent from predictions made by
aggregate representative agent based models, as was summarized by Heathcote(2005) . This how-
ever, is not without criticism. Auerbach(2000) and Mankiw(2000) argue that it is imperative to
use heterogenous agent based models for dynamic scal policy analysis such as dynamic scoring
because they can provide additional distributional results for the policy makers. But the former is
very skeptical about the possibility of di¤erent aggregate implications from these models. Finally,
Mankiw and Weinzierl(2006) reports that using a heterogenous models such as the saver-spender
model does not change the prediction of the representative agent models. Despite that, Joint
Committee of Taxation(2006) have introduced the saver-spender model in its dynamic scoring
analysis.
The present paper will develop a modied version of the savers-spenders model. We argue that
the use of standard saver-spender model in the dynamic scal policy analysis has been fruitless
so far because of some inherent limitations of the model which are rather unrealistic. All the
previous papers that have used three crucial assumptions in their saver-spender model, which
to our view, dampens the relative importance of the heterogeneity in their models. First, the
spenders do not have access to the credit market. Second, these models assume that the spenders
are Rule of Thumb Consumers in the sense that they do not participate in the labor market
and take the wage bargained by the saver as given. third, the spenders are not intertemporal
optimizers. The only paper that challenges these assumptions is Yang(2007) who assumes the
rst two assumptions but models spenders as intra-temporal optimizers. Yet she still gets results
very similar to the Mankiw and Weinzierl(2006). In my paper, I argue that the spenders could
be credit constrained and at the same time intertemporal optimizers. I impose the assumption
of Internal Habit Persistence on the preference of both the saver and the spender. This forces
everyone in the economy to think at the intertemporal margins. We will show that the impulse
response of all the major macro and scal variables for various tax shocks look quite di¤erent
and sometimes contrasting to the representative agent based model.
3 The Model
Following Mankiw(2000), Yang(2007) and JCT(2006),the economy has two types of innitely-
lived agents: savers and non-savers, competitive rms, and a government. Both the population
and the total amount of time an agent is endowed with are normalized to 1. A fraction F of the
agents are savers and the remaining (1  F ) are spenders.
3.1 Optimization of the Saver
The savers consume, save and work in this model. The representative saver chooses Consumption(Cat ),
Investment(Iat ), Capital(K
a
t ), Government issued one period bonds(B
a
t ), and Labour(L
a
t ) to max-
imize utility over consumption and leisure(1  Lat ):
1To this date, Joint Committe of Taxation uses four models for their scal policy analysis; Joint Commit-
tee macroeconomic equilibrium growth model(MEG), the overlapping generations lifecycle model (OLG), Global
Insight econometric model(GI) and a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium neoclassical growth model with in-
nitely lived agents (DSGE). The Congressional Budget O¢ ce uses di¤erent versions of the OLG model, the Ramsey
model, the GI model and a "MacroadvisersModel" which is also a representative agent based model. For a detailed
description of each of these models, see Joint Committee of Taxation(2005a, b) and Dennis and Page(2003).
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Max :
fCat ;Kat ;Lat g
Et
1X
t=0
t1
"
(Cat )
1 1   1
1  1
+ a
(1  Lat )1 1
1  1
#
(1)
subject to the budget constraint:
Cat + I
a
t +B
a
t  (1  kt )rtKat 1 + (1  Lat )WtLat +Rbt 1Bat 1 + trat (2)
Cat = C
a
t   b1Cat 1 (3)
The law of motion for capital has the following form:
Kat = (1  )Kat 1 + Iat (4)
The superscript a and p indicate variables associated with the saver and the non-saver.1is
the subjective discount factor for the saver. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution(IES) for
the consumption and leisure for the saver are 11 and
1
1
respectively(1 > 0; 1  0). The Frisch
elasticity of leisure is dened as (1 L
a
t )
1Lat
. rt and Wt are respectively the rental rate of capital and
the wage rate. kt ,
La
t are tax rate on capital and labour income of the saver.  is the economic
depreciation rate of capita . ais the weight that saver places on leisure. b1indicates the degree
of internal habit persistence for the saver.
The Lagrangian function for the optimization problem after combining (2) and (4) is written
as follows:
$ = Et
1X
t=0
t1
264 (C
a
t )
1 1 1
1 1 + 
a (1 Lat )1 1
1 1
+at

(1  kt )rtKat 1 + (1  Lat )WtLat +Rbt 1Bat 1
+trat   Cat  Kat  Bat + (1  )Kat
 375 (5)
The rst order conditions are as follows:
(Cat )
 1   Et1b1
 
Cat+1
 1 = at (6)
a(1  Lat ) 1 = at (1  Lat )Wt (7)
at = Et1
a
t+1
n
(1  kt+1)rt+1 + (1  )
o
(8)
at = Et1
a
t+1R
b
t (9)
Dene,
Rkt = (1  kt )rt + (1  ) (10)
Therefore, equation (8) could be re-written as:
at = Et1
a
t+1R
k
t+1 (11)
Combining (6) and (7) and substituting (3), we get:
a(1  Lat ) 1 =
n 
Cat   b1Cat 1
 1   Et1b1  Cat+1   b1Cat  1o (1  Lat )Wt (11.a)
Equation(11.a) shows that the labor supply decisions of the saver depends on the intertem-
poral consumption decisions.
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3.2 Optimization of the Spender
The spenders consume and work in this model. The representative spender chooses Consumption(Cpt )
and Labour(Lpt ) to maximize utility over consumption and leisure(1  Lpt ):
Max :
fCpt ;Lptg
Et
1X
t=0
t2
" 
Cpt
1 2   1
1  2
+ p
(1  Lpt )1 2
1  2
#
(12)
subject to the budget constraint:
Cpt  (1  Lpt )WtLpt + trpt (13)
Cpt = C
p
t   b2Cpt 1 (14)
Here 2,b2; 
Lp
t ,
p has the usual interpretation for the spender.
The rst order conditions are as follows: 
Cpt
 2   Et2b2  Cpt+1 2 = pt (15)
p(1  Lpt ) 2 = pt (1  Lpt )Wt (16)
Combining (15) and (16) and substituting (14), we get:
p(1  Lpt ) 2 =
n 
Cpt   b2Cpt 1
 2   Et2b2  Cpt+1   b2Cpt  2o (1  Lpt )Wt (16.a)
There are several interesting feature of the spenders preference structure. First habit persis-
tence makes consumption non-separable in time for agents. Therefore, intertemporal consumption
decisions force agents to make intertemporal labor decisions, even for spenders. This becomes
clear if we look at (16.a). Suppose there is an expected increase in Cpt+1. This would reduce
marginal utility of consumption at t + 1. According to equation(16.a), this would increase the
RHS. In order to maintain equality, the LHS of the equation has to go up, which would require
Lpt to increase . Since the labor supply today depends on consumption tomorrow, the spenders
are neither Rule-of-Thumb consumers, nor are they intra-temporal optimizers. They are simply
credit constrained. This is a direct contrast from Mankiw(2000), Mankiw-Weinzierl (2005) and
Yang(2007).
3.3 Optimization of the rm
The rms maximize their prot by choosing amount of aggregate capital and labor Kt and Lt
Max
fKt;Ltg
: Kt L
1 
t  WtLt   rtKt 1 (17)
Yt = K

t 1L
1 
t (18)
The rst order conditions for the rm determines the wage and the rental rate:
Wt = (1  )Yt
Lt
(19)
rt = 
Yt
Kt 1
(19.a)
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3.4 The Government
The government collects taxes from the savers and the spenders, issues bonds,provides transfers
and consumes part of the goods as government spending which is completely wasted or thrown
away in the ocean. The government budget constraint looks like:
Rbt 1Bt 1 + TRt +Gt = Tt +Bt (20)
Where Tt is the total tax collected dened as:
Tt = T
l
t + T
k
t (21)
T lt = F  Lat WtLat + (1  F )  Lpt WtLpt (22)
T kt = 
k
t rtKt 1 (23)
Finally,the total transfer in the economy, TRt looks like:
TRt = TR
a
t + TR
p
t (24)
Where TRat , TR
p
t are aggregate transfers to the savers and the spenders, to be dened shortly.
The government also has to maintain intertemporal scal solvency. This will be achieved by
using two conditions. First, any equilibrium must satisfy the Transversality conditions for the
debt and capital accumulation:
Et lim
T !1
t+T1 u
0  
Cat+T

Bt+T = 0 (25)
Et lim
T !1
t+T1 u
0  
Cat+T

Kt+T 1 = 0 (26)
Imposing the TVC on the ow budget constraint of the government, we derive the intertem-
poral budget constraint for the government:
Bt
Yt
= sBt =
1X
j=0
dt;t+j
"
(1  ) Lat+j
FLat+j
Lt+j
+ (1  ) Lpt+j
(1 F )Lpt+j
Lt+j
+kt+j   sGt+j   sTRt+j
#
(27)
Where Ltis the aggregate labor supply in the economy, to be dened later and dt;t+j =
j 1i=oR
 1
t+i
Yt+i+1
Yt+i
. Equation(26) implies that the TVC condition for debt is satised.
Furthermore, following Leeper and Young(2006), the government uses di¤erent policy rules to
adjust for any debt-nanced tax cuts. The policy rules that the government uses are summarized
as follows:
ln

sTR
a
t
sTRa

= qTRa ln
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qTRa  0 (28)
ln

sTR
p
t
sTRp

= qTRp ln
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qTRp  0 (29)
ln

sGt
sG

= qG ln
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qG  0 (30)
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ln
 
Lat
La
!
= qLa ln
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qLa  0 (31)
ln
 

Lp
t
Lp
!
= qLp ln
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qLp  0 (32)
ln

Kt
K

= qK
 
sBt 1
sB
!
; qK > 0 (33)
3.5 Aggregation
The aggregate variables are dened as follows:
It = F  Iat (34)
Bt = F Bat (35)
Kt = F Kat (36)
TRat = F  trat (37)
TRpt = (1  F )  trpt (38)
Lt = F  Lat + (1  F )  Lpt (39)
Ct = F  Cat + (1  F )  Cpt (40)
The aggregate resource constraint looks like:
Ct + It +Gt = Yt (41)
In addition, we will dene aggregate budget constraint for the savers and the spenders:
FCat + It +Bt = (1  kt )rtKt 1 + (1  Lat )WtFLat +Rbt 1Bt 1 + TRat (42)
(1  F )Cpt = (1  Lpt )Wt(1  F )Lpt + TRpt (43)
3.6 Denition of Competitive equilibrium
A competitive rational expectations equilibrium is dened as the agents decisions, {Ca;pt ,L
a;p
t ,K
a
t ,B
a
t }
1
t=0,
the rms decisions, { Lt,Kt}1t=0, prices, {Wt,rt }1t=0 and policy variables, {Bt, Gt,Kt ,
La
t ,
Lp
t ,TRt
}1t=0, such that, given initial levels of capital and debt,Kt 1and Bt 1, the optimality conditions
for the di¤erent kinds of agents and rms problems are solved; the goods, capital, labor and the
bond markets clear; the transversality conditions for capital and debt hold; the government bud-
get constraint and the policy rules(equations 28-33) and all the aggregate conditions(equations
34-43) are satised. We will only consider the ranges of the scal adjustment parameters- the
qs- that are consistent with the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
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3.7 Calibration and Solution Method
An analytical solution of the model is not available; the equilibrium conditions are log-linearized
around the original steady state growth path and analyzed in terms of percentage deviations from
that steady state. The model is solved using Simss(2001) algorithm. The model is calibrated at
an annual frequency. Table 1 reports the benchmark values of parameters and the steady state
values of variables before a permanent tax rate change. The choices of the values for structural
parameters are comparable to McGrattan(1994) and Jones(2002) and are taken from Yang(2007),
Leeper and Yang(2006), Joint Committee of Taxation(2006) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Fischer(2005). The model implies that in the original steady state, the fraction of time spent
on working is 0.2, the consumption-output ratio is 0.63, the investment-output ratio is 0.17, the
debt-output ratio in the original steady state before the tax cut is 0.376, roughly corresponding
to the ratio of federal debt held by the public to GDP in 2005[Table 78, economic report of the
President(2006)]. Every version of the Saver-Spender must satisfy the above set of aggregate
restrictions.
3.8 Steady State of the system
Using (19), (19.a),the steady state system looks like:
(Ca) 1 (1  1b1) = a (44)
a(1  La) 1 = a(1  La)Y
L
(45)
Rk = Rb =
1
1
(46)
(Cp) 2 (1  2b2) = p (48)
p(1  Lp) 2 = p(1  Lp)Y
L
(49)
In addition, we will need the following steady state version of the aggregate budget constraint
for the spender and the aggregate resource constraint:
(1  F )Cp = (1  Lp)(1  F )L
p
L
Y + TRp (50)
C + K +G = Y (51)
4 Dynamic Impacts of Tax rate cuts under alternative nancing
schemes
In this section, we will analyze dynamic e¤ects of various alternative nancing schemes in response
to a debt-nanced tax cuts. We will compare our results between di¤erent versions of the Savers-
Spenders(SS from now) model and a modied version of Leeper and Young(2006, MLY from now)
where we will hold the assumption of a representative agent but add internal habit persistence to
his behavior. The di¤erent versions of the SS model will help us to identify the role of di¤erent
kinds of heterogeneity on the dynamic behavior of the model. Table 2 summarizes the list of
features and assumptions adopted by each version of the SS model. Model 1 is the baseline
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Saver-Spender model. where there is no additional heterogeneity. That means our model di¤ers
from the MLY model only by the existence of the credit constrained spenders. While solving for
the initial steady state for the SS model, we explicitly impose the condition that both groups
supply equal amount of labor, La = Lp = 0:2 and no behavioral or preference heterogeneity.
These assumptions are counter-factual,as was documented by Yang(2007). We impose these
assumptions because this model is very similar to the Mankiw(2000) and the heterogenous model
used in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006). Furthermore, Gali, Salido and Valles(2004.a) explicitly
uses this assumption. While Analyzing model 1, we will also report responses from the original
Leeper and Yang(2006, OLY from now) model in addition to the MLY results. Model 2 is the
SS model where there is preference heterogeneity. We will pose restrictions 1 = 1, 2 = 2:0,
a = 2.721, p = 2.543. That means that the spenders and the savers in the SS model has
intertemporal elasticity of leisure equal to 0.5 and 1.0, whether corresponding Frisch elasticities
are 2 and 4 respectively. The saver has preference identical to the representative agent of the
MLY model. The spenders also put less weight on leisure in their preference. This SS model
produces a steady state wage of 0.7257 while the MLY models wage rate is 0.8487. The steady
state interest rates are 0.2218 and 0.2179 respectively. Model 3 is the SS model with exible
labor supply. Here we retain all the parameter specication of the previous model but relax the
counterfactual assumption of equal labor supply. We allow agents to endogenously choose their
labor supply in the original steady state but still maintain the assumption of aggregate labor
supply to be 0.2. This original steady state produces NLa = 0:2361; Lp = 0:1458;W = 0:8247.
The fact that savers labor supply is greater than the spender is consistent with other papers2.
The IES and the Frisch elasticity are identical to the Model 2. Model 4 is the full-edged
SS model outlined in the previous section with preference and tax heterogeneity. The savers
have a larger marginal labor tax rate than the spender, following Yang(2007) and Jones(2002).
With restriction on the aggregate labor supply, the original steady state produces La = 0:2828
and Lp = 0:0758:Therefore, spenders supply approximately half of the labor of the previous SS
model. This will enable us to perfectly compare between the SS and MLY model without any
ambiguity.
4.1 Impulse Response Functions for a Capital Tax cut Financed by Transfers
Figure 1 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of capital tax where the tax
cut is nanced by lump-sum transfers in model 1. That means policy rules (28) and (29) are
operative. So, debt-nanced decits reduce expected future transfers to both groups. Fiscal
adjustment parameters are summarized in Table 3. In the OLY model(dotted-dashed line), the
tax cut has expansionary e¤ect on output(tax base), with higher investment and hours worked
along the transition path. Upon impact, a capital tax cut increases the after tax return on
investment and the disposable income. This interest rate e¤ect prompts the agent to substitute
for more investment and less consumption. Lower consumption increases the marginal benet
of working, and with a higher elasticity of substitution, increasing labor supply. Output goes
up and so does wage. After the permanent decline in capital tax, the agent faces the prospect
of a declined transfer. The e¤ect of future decline in the transfers is dominated by increase in
income from investment and labor supply. As the economy converges to the new steady state,
this combined wealth e¤ect begins to dominate the substitution e¤ect as the value of elasticity
goes down, raising consumption and leisure. Labor supply and investment decreases somewhat,
but remains above the original steady state. Although interest rate comes back to the original
level, wage and output remains above the original level. Continued increase in the debt increases
2Other papers have dealt with the di¤erence between the labor supply of the saver and spender in a di¤erent way.
Yang(2007) assumes that the savers are more productive by introducing skill di¤erences in her model. Although
we refrain from doing so, our results are consistent with her work.
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interest payment and a permanently lower tax revenue keep net revenue(total revenue-net interest
payment) permanently lower along the transition path. The picture is somewhat similar in the
MLY model(solid line), with some exceptions. The introduction of habit persistence complicates
the economic analysis of the transitional dynamics. Lags in consumption makes labor supply
decisions more intertemporally dependent. For the representative agent, faced with habit, the
tax cut creates smaller substitution e¤ect, leading to smaller immediate increase in labor supply
and investment. Consumption therefore, declines by a smaller amount because of the excess
smoothness induced by habit. The immediate jump in output is also smaller for the same reason.
Therefore, tax revenue and net revenue falls by slightly smaller amount. But since the habit
persistence has only one period lag, the multiplier e¤ect would be di¤erent between the models
with and without habit persistence only in the short run, as could be inferred from Brown(1952).
In the long run, as he pointed out, these di¤erences disappear and we see very similar transition
path for the OLY and MLY models. In the SS model(dashed line), the impulse response of the
aggregate variables look very similar. But this model o¤ers a di¤erent mechanics, as could be
observed by the di¤erences in the movement of relative prices. The saver exhibits similar behavior
to the representative agent in the MLY model. But for the spender, the story is di¤erent. Since
they do not accumulate capital, the tax cut does not have any direct impact on their disposable
income. In face of the negative income e¤ect of the future decline in transfer, the consumer will
want to smooth consumption by the only instrument he has, by increasing labor supply. For
him, labor supply decisions will follow strong intertemporal dependence. Habit persistence will
play two roles. Saver will immediately reduce current consumption to smooth out consumption
in future when they expect transfers to go down. Along the transition path, habit persistence
will rst induce steeper and then gradual increase in labor supply throughout the entire the
transition path. This has an interesting e¤ect on consumption. In the short run, steep increase
in the labor supply will dominate the negative income e¤ect from decline in the transfer, increasing
consumption. But in the long run consumption will decline because of the lagged consumption
e¤ect,creating a hump-shape pattern and remaining above the original steady state. This however
will allow the spender to enjoy more leisure, which is consistent with the attening out of the
labor supply in the long run. At the aggregate, the decline in the labor supply by the saver
dominates the increase in labor supply by the spender, party because of the stronger wealth
e¤ect experienced by the former. Wages decline at the beginning, but continues to be above the
original level, although always below the MLY model. Debt, interest payment, tax revenue and
net revenue all exhibit very similar transition path compared to the MLY model.
Several important observations emerge from model 1. First, habit persistence does not add
too much to the dynamic behavior of the agents along the transition path. It creates immediate
and short di¤erences with almost no long run consequences. It also helps to smooth out the
transition path. Second, credit constraint alone does not alter the qualitative behavior in the
aggregate. But if we look at the disaggregate level, we see signicantly contrasting behavior from
the saver and the spender. The reason why aggregate behavior is almost unchanged could stems
from two factors. First, the fraction of the saver in our model is too small for them to overpower
the savers in the aggregate impacts. Second, the behavior of the spenders, although di¤erent
from the savers, is not contrasting enough to force the aggregate behavior in their favor. Their
response could be enhanced by adding more heterogeneity to their behavior and we might see
changes in the aggregate as well. This is what we will do in the next couple of models
Figure 2 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of capital tax nanced
by lump-sum transfer in model 2. The saver exhibits behavior similar to the previous model.
Spender, with a smaller elasticity would leave labor supply almost unchanged while reducing
consumption for compensation. This would rise the aggregate labor supply, but now smaller than
the MLY model. Consumption for the spender rises quite dramatically in the short run while
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labor supply shows less dramatic increase, owning to a declined Frisch elasticity. The aggregate
labor supply shows dramatically smaller decline in the short run because of the spenders more
unwillingness to substitute labor both intra-temporarily and inter-temporarily. For the saver,
the income e¤ect from the capital tax cut dominate the substitution e¤ect, causing consumption
to go up and labor to go down further in the long run and in the new steady state. For the
spender, after a brief increase, consumption peaks within the rst 10 years and then shows
dramatic decline in the longrun, falling even below the original steady state. The labor supply
goes up in the longrun, but now smaller than the previous model. The aggregate labor supply is
almost unchanged along the transition path, always being above the MLY case. The aggregate
consumption is now below and investment is now above the MLY model. Higher investment and
a higher labor supply allows output to be above the MLY model throughout the transition path
and into the new steady state. Both tax revenue and Net tax revenue in the SS model are now
higher than the MLY model. There appears to be small qualitative di¤erences in the dynamic
responses as well. Output, consumption, investment and net tax revenue all converge at the same
rate between the two models while aggregate labor supply converges quicker in the SS model.The
results are very similar in model 3 and do not report them3.
Figure 3 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of capital tax nanced by
lump-sum transfer in model 4. For the spender, they face a smaller marginal labor tax. Their
after tax disposable income is therefore bigger than the previous SS models. A capital tax cut
produces similar immediate e¤ect in both MLY and SS model; consumptions go down a little
bit, labor supply rapidly increases for saver because of the substitution e¤ect, the increase now
bigger than the previous SS model. With almost no immediate change in the wage, spenders
labor supply is unchanged. A lower labor tax enables the spenders to enjoy a higher disposable
income even with a lower labor supply. This helps them to overcome the negative income e¤ect
from the transfer cut and we see an increase in consumption in the short run, similar to the
previous model. However, low elasticity forces the spenders to persistently increase their labor
supply. Upon impact,after tax return on capital now increases less than the MLY model, raising
investment by a lesser amount. Output rises, but falls below the MLY case. For the saver,
the income e¤ect starts to dominate very early and we see gradual decline in labor supply and
increase in consumption, both along the transition path and to the new steady state. For spender,
the gradual decline in transfer e¤ects them more because they receive 70% of the transfer. As
a result, the negative income e¤ect will force them to reduce consumption in the short run,
creating a hump-shape response. In the long run, consumption will decline further to a steady
state similar to the previous model. The aggregate consumption is lower in the short run and
goes slightly above the MLY model in the longrun. This allows the investment to lie below the
MLY model in the short run but pushes above it in the long run. On the other hand, spenders
continue to increase labor supply along the transition path. However, smaller elasticities force
them to supply labor at a higher rate. As a result,the aggregate labor supply lies above the MLY
case through out the transition path. Output goes above the MLY model in the long run. For
the rst time, we see the trend in debt/output ratio to deviate from the MLY model as a result
of the movement in output. Tax revenue is way below the MLY model because of the smaller
revenue collected from the spender, indicating a much more contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut.
Net revenue also lies below the MLY model. We notice three interesting things. First, there
is an interesting interaction between habit persistence and elasticities. In the short run, habit
persistence for the spender overpowers the lower elasticities in creating a substitution e¤ect that
leads to a more prolonged hump-shape response from the consumption of the spenders. In the
longrun, lower elasticities overpower the habit persistence that sort of strengthens the negative
3The impulse response graph for model 3 is available upon request.
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income e¤ect, creating a more dramatic decline in consumption for the spender. In the aggregate,
total labor supply, output and consumption seems to under perform the MLY model while in
the longrun, they over perform. Second, there are now substantial qualitative di¤erence of the
behavior from the scal variables. Third, response from both macro and scal variables appear
to be smoother than the MLY model.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions for a Labor Tax cut Financed by Transfers
Figure 4 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of labor tax in model 1 where the tax cut
is nanced by lump-sum transfers. In the OLY model, this has a expansionary e¤ect, raising
consumption, investment, labor supply and output. In the long run, the wealth e¤ect motivates
the agent to subside labor supply and investment. Consumption and output increases even further
and output attens out a bit. The e¤ect on investment and therefore on output would be smaller
compared to the capital tax cut case, both for the immediate e¤ect and the transition path. Both
remains above the original steady state. Debt and interest payment increases continuously along
the transition path and both tax revenue and net revenue are below the original steady state.
In the MLY model, we now see some interesting deviations. A decline in labor tax increases
the after tax return on labor and substitution e¤ect increases labor supply(reduce leisure) and
consumption upon impact, although by smaller amount because of habit. The labor tax cut
indirectly increases rental rate by increasing output. Investment jumps up, again by a smaller
amount. The short run di¤erences in the multiplier e¤ect dies out very quickly and as the
wealth e¤ect begins to dominate, investment and labor supply subside a bit and converges to the
long run steady state, being above the original one. Consumption and output again increases
further but attens out quickly to the new steady state. Convergence to the new steady state
for consumption, output and labor supply is noticeably faster for the OLY model compared to
the MLY model. Net tax revenue cosnsistently go down while remaining above the OLY model.
In the SS model, the saver, again, exhibits similar behavior to the representative agent of the
MLY model; consumption and labor supply jumps up upon impact. After that, consumption
shows persistent increase to move to the new steady state while labor supply shows persistent
decline to go below the original one. For the spender, the initial substitution e¤ect is dominated
by the income e¤ect which prompts him to reduce labor supply a bit and increase consumption.
Along the transition path, the decline in transfer weakens the income e¤ect and forces him to
increase his labor supply. Habit persistence coupled with the decline in the transfer creates a
hump shape consumption response. At the aggregate,the initial jump in consumption is larger
compared to the MLY model, stemming from the combined response from the saver and the
spender. Aggregate labor supply and investment has a smaller upward jump, creating smaller
jump in output. In the short run, investment shows a slower decline while labor supply exhibits a
sharper increase. The latter converges to the new steady state faster and the former shows more
persistence. Output also shows similar persistence while converging to the new steady state. As
a result net revenue remains below the MLY case during most of the transition path.
Figure 5 compares the e¤ect of labor tax cut nanced by lump-sum transfer in model 2. For
the saver, there is an immediate jump in labor supply and consumption. For the spender, the
lower elasticity now produces stronger results, reducing labor supply and a smaller increase in
consumption upon impact. With a lower IES, the decline in spenders labor supply is lower. With
an immediate increase in after tax wage, savers labor supply jumps up higher than the MLY
case. This results in a larger increases in the initial labor supply. Lower Frisch elasticity on the
other hand forces spenders to substitute less leisure for consumption and as a result, the initial
increase in consumption is lower. In the short run, with almost no change in the real wage, the
negative income e¤ect from the reduced transfer forces the spender to rapidly increase his labor
supply. This results in a short run increase in his consumption. Aggregate labor supply continues
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to increase dramatically and Output shoots up almost immediately above the MLY case. In the
long run, spenders labor supply is less smooth compared to the previous model. Lower Frisch
elasticity now allows for even smaller substitution between leisure and consumption, thereby
reducing consumption. Aggregate output and investment remains above the MLY model while
consumption is always below the MLY model. In the new steady state, spenders consumption
goes down below the original steady state while savers consumption is above the old one. Savers
labor supply almost comes back to the original steady state, while spenders labor supply is
higher than the original steady state. Aggregate labor supply and output is much higher than
the original steady state. Investment is slightly above and aggregate consumption is below the
original steady state. We see signicant qualitative and quantitative di¤erences between the SS
and the MLY model. Output is higher from the onset and the gap seems to widen in the new
steady state. The aggregate labor supply shows remarkable contrast. Rather than going down
in the short run, it shoots up even further the gap widens signicantly in the new steady state.
Tax revenue increases rapidly from the onset stays signicantly higher than the MLY case. That
means the tax cut is less contractionary in the SS model. However, because of similar interest
rate and debt movement, the net tax revenue follows path similar to the MLY model, although
staying above the latter throughout the transition path. Model 3 shows similar behavior as above
and we do not report them.
Figure 6 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated 1% permanent cut of labor tax for both
savers and the spenders nanced by lump-sum transfer to both groups in model 4. Savers exhibit
behavior identical to model 3. But for the spenders, a 1% decline in the labor tax now has
a smaller substitution e¤ect. Therefore, negative income e¤ect dominates from the onset and
we see a persistent decline in consumption throughout the transition path. As before, lower
elasticities force the spenders to increase their labor supply throughout, similar to the previous
SS model. But same pattern in their labor supply now produces less impact on the aggregate
labor supply and we see that the total labor supply is below the MLY throughout the transition
path, although showing similar pattern. Aggregate consumption is naturally below the MLY case.
But with habit persistence , it looks atter. Investment is below the MLY model throughout the
transition. Lower investment leads to lower capital accumulation which coupled with a lower
labor supply, forces output to be below the MLY model also. The decline in tax revenue is much
greater, again indicating a much more contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut. Net revenue also
falls below the MLY model. Overall, the scal variables show qualitatively and quantitatively
di¤erent behavior and the macro variables show response which are quantitatively di¤erent but
qualitatively quite similar to the MLY model although more persistent.
4.3 Impulse Response Functions of a Capital Tax cut Financed by Govern-
ment Spending
Figure 7 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of capital tax where the tax cut is nanced by
reducing government-output ratio in model 1. That means policy rule (30) is operative. In the
OLY model, initial impact of the tax cut has e¤ect on consumption, investment, output and labor
supply similar to the transfer reduction case. But after that, the reduction in the government
spending raises wealth by absorbing smaller share of the output. Wealthier household consumes
more leisure, reducing labor supply along the transition path and in the new steady state. It
also crowds in private consumption, raising consumption above its original steady state. On the
other hand, an increase in the after tax return on capital raises investment which also raises
steady state capital stock. This combined e¤ect ultimately raises output in the new steady state,
but now signicantly lower than the transfer adjustment case. Wages fall below the original
steady state while after tax return on capital comes back to the original steady state. An almost
unchanged tax base coupled with a tax cut and increased debt reduces tax and net tax revenue
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along the transition path to a lower steady state. In the MLY model, there are very similar
results. The jump in initial investment is lower because wealthy consumers, because of habit,
reduces consumption only by a small amount, allocating less income in savings. The behavior
of the rest of the economy follows the OLY model. In the SS model, the aggregate behavior
also exhibits similar pattern. On the disaggregate level we again see contrasting behavior from
the saver and the spender. For the saver, the wealth e¤ect dominates along the entire transition
path, allowing him to reduce his labor supply consistently. The spender initially increases labor
supply with no change in consumption. In the short run,the crowding in e¤ect increases his
income, allowing him to enjoy more leisure and consumption. But in the long run, with wages
rising, the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect and the spender increases his labor
supply to a higher new steady state. But as was mentioned above, the fraction of the spender is
small enough for the saver to dominate the spender in the aggregate, producing similar aggregate
behavior compared to the MLY model.
Figure 8 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of capital tax nanced government spending
in model 2. We see interesting results. The immediate e¤ect of the tax cut is very similar to the
previous model. In the short run, crowding in increases consumption for both agents and wealth
e¤ect reduces labor supply. In the long run, a higher wage now forces spenders to supply more
labor. But because of lower Frisch elasticity, less leisure is substituted for consumption. Labor
supply continues to increase but falls below the original steady for the spender. Labor supply
for the saver continues to fall and the new steady state is lower than the old, although closer
than the previous model. In the aggregate, we see a decline in the labor supply in the short run,
although smaller because of the slower decline for the saver. Investment always stays above the
MLY model because of the crowding in e¤ect. Output continues to decline, but always above
the MLY case because of the boost from relatively higher investment and aggregate labor supply.
In the new steady state, output is somewhat above the original steady state, a contrast with
the previous model while tax and net tax revenue are below the original steady state, although
approximately 1% above the MLY model. Output, labor supply, investment, tax and net tax
revenue all exhibit a fanning out e¤ect; comparing with the MLY model, the longrun e¤ect is
more pronounced than the short run e¤ect.
Figure 9 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of capital tax nanced by gov-
ernment spending in model 3. This time the SS model produces response almost indistinguishable
from the MLY model, a sharp contrast to model 2.
Why do we see dynamic behavior in model 3 very similar to the MLY while in model 2, there
were sharp di¤erences? The answer lies in the equal labor supply assumptions that we had in
the previous model but relaxed in the present model. For the saver, analyzing transition from a
steady state labor supply of 0:2361 instead of the counter-factual assumption of 0:2 signicantly
strengthens their dynamic response in the present model. For the spender,analyzing transition
from a steady state labor supply of 0:1458 instead of 0:2 weakens their dynamic response. In the
aggregate behavior, savers have larger fraction. Therefore, the dynamic behavior of the aggregate
model follows their behavior, making it look very similar to a representative model . This model
clearly shows the perils of using rule-of-thumb assumptions where the spenders follow the savers
in their labor supply decisions because it can cause both underestimation and overestimation of
responses for the two groups.
Figure 10 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of capital tax nanced government spending
in model 4. The response of the macro variables are very similar to the model 2. This is because
only the saversresponses are amplied. The total labor supply slightly is lower because of the
reason mentioned in the previous subsection. Output therefore is also slightly below the MLY
case. Debt/Output ratio is above the MLY case for the same reason. Tax revenue shows more
negative impact, as expected and net revenue also falls below the MLY model. All the scal
variables also exhibit fanning out e¤ect.
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4.4 Impulse Response Functions of a Labor Tax cut Financed by Government
Spending
Figure 11 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of labor tax where the tax cut is nanced by
reducing government-output ratio in model 1. In the OLY model, upon impact, consumption,
output, labor supply and investment shows response similar to the transfer cut case. In the
short run, lack of any signicant interest rate e¤ect combined with the crowding in e¤ect reduces
investment while consumption continues to increase. wealth e¤ect also causes labor supply to go
down, which coupled with a declined investment also reduces output. In the long run, the output,
investment and labor supply all fall below their original steady state while consumption exhibits
a persistent increase to a new and higher steady state. Tax and net tax revenue falls signicantly
below their original steady state. The MLY model exhibits identical behavior with respect to all
the macro and scal variables concerned. The SS model too exhibits similar aggregate behavior.
The saver mimics the representative agent in the MLY model . For the spender, the wealth e¤ect
from the crowding in and the reduced labor tax cut allows them to reduce their labor supply
upon impact. But very quickly, the substitution e¤ect starts to dominate the income e¤ect and
we see a rapid and then a persistent increase in the labor supply throughout the transition path
to a new and higher labor supply. Higher labor supply allows them to enjoy a higher level of
consumption everywhere along the transition path.
Figure 12 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of labor tax nanced by government spending
in model 2. The immediate e¤ect of the tax cut is similar to model 1. For both saver and the
spender, the short run response in terms of consumption and labor supply is also similar. But in
the long run, due to a lower IES and Frisch elasticity, the spender raises his labor supply very close
to the original steady state, a contrast to the previous model while consumption shows similar
level in the new steady state. The labor supply for the spender goes down in the new steady state,
but now very close to the original steady state, another contrast. The aggregate labor supply
remains above the MLY case, mainly due to savers response. Investment is higher the MLY
model. This forces output to be above the MLY model, although still below their own original
steady state. The tax revenue, although declining, is higher than the MLY model, indicating a
less contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut. The fanning out e¤ect of the aggregate variables again
emerge, although less signicant now. In model 3, we see impulse responses similar to the MLY
model. The source of this contradiction with model 2 was explained in the previous section.
Figure 13 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of labor tax for both the
saver and the spender nanced by government spending in model 4. Again, the behavior of the
saver is identical to the model 2. For the spenders, we see di¤erent response. The cut in the (lower)
tax rate produces smaller substitute e¤ect and with a decline in future government spending,
labor supply goes down immediately, now more pronounced than model 2. Consumption takes
an upward jump, but now quite smaller. In the short run, crowding in allows consumption go
up rapidly but by a smaller amount. Lower elasticities force them to increase their labor supply
persistently. In the long run, positive income e¤ect from the crowding in is dominated by the
e¤ect from an increasingly lower substitutability between consumption and leisure and therefore,
makes the transition path for consumption almost at. In the new steady state, consumption
is higher than the original one, but now signicantly below the previous SS model. Their labor
supply goes up to a higher labor in the new steady state. In the aggregate, consumption now
falls below the MLY model. In the longrun and the new steady state, the gap is even bigger.
Output, investment and total labor supply initially trails the MLY model, but eventually catches
up in the new steady state. Tax revenue and net tax revenue shows very similar trend.
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4.5 Impulse Response Functions of a Capital Tax cut Financed by Labor Tax
Figure 14 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of capital tax where the tax cut is nanced
by increasing the labor tax rate in model 1. As Leeper and Yang(2006) points out, this is an
interesting experiment because one distortionary tax is somewhat replaced by another one. In the
OLY model, the immediate e¤ect is similar to other experiment with capital tax; consumption,
goes down while investment, labor supply and output goes up. In the short run, positive income
e¤ect from reduced capital tax cut dominates the negative income e¤ect from the labor tax
increase and the combined positive wealth e¤ect dominates substitution e¤ect from the wage rate
and the interest rate. Consumption increases somewhat but then goes down again. In the long
run, the reduction in after tax return on labor dominates everything else. We see a decline in
labor supply which reduces output. This reduces return on capital and investment goes down as
well. Although investment and capital stock is higher in the new steady state, both labor supply
and output dives below their original steady state. A lower output level coupled with a xed
government-output ratio unambiguously reduce consumption. For the scal variables, higher
capital accumulation and a higher labor tax rate increases tax revenue in the new steady state.
As Leeper and Yang(2006) pointed out, this increase in tax revenue should not be misunderstood
as generated by a cut in capital tax alone. The net revenue, because of rising debt and interest
payments, is always below the original steady state. The MLY model almost mimics the OLY
model. The SS model also exhibits similar aggregate behavior. The savers behavior is again
comparable to the MLY model. The spender however, now shows di¤erent behavior. In the short
run, habit persistence forces them to increase consumption even in the face of a future negative
income e¤ect. According to (16.a), a rise in consumption leads to a rise in future marginal utility
from consumption which forces the spender to reduce their labor supply. After a while, decrease
in consumption forces future marginal utility to reduce , asking spender to increase his labor
supply a little bit. In the long run prolonged decline in consumption will persistently increase
future marginal utility, making labor supply go down even in the new steady state. In model 2
and 3, we see trend very similar to model 1.
Figure 15 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of capital tax in model 4 nanced by a
systematic increase in the labor tax on both groups, following rules from equations (31) and (32).
Comparing with the previous SS model, we see fundamentally di¤erent response from both the
macro and the scal variables. For the saver, the immediate e¤ect of the capital tax cut increases
labor supply,similar to the previous SS model. Their consumption decreases upon impact. In the
very short run , income e¤ect from the reduced capital tax cut dominates the negative income
e¤ect from an higher labor tax; consumption goes up even above their original steady state
level. The negative income e¤ect is larger because savers supply more labor and wages also go
up. The negative income e¤ect starts to dominate very quickly and consumption, after a brief
increase, goes down. In the longrun and in the new steady state, we see a much larger decline
in consumption. Labor supply however continues fall to a new steady state even lower than
the model 2 or 3. The e¤ect on the spender is radically di¤erent. They do not experience any
immediate tax cut; consumption remains unchanged upon impact while labor supply increases
because of an immediate decline in wage that resulted from the upward movement in the interest
rate. In the short run, an increase in the labor tax creates perplexing response. The substituting
e¤ect from a lower after tax wage interacts with habit persistence and lower elasticities forcing
consumption to go up but also labor supply to go down as well. But the e¤ect of habit wears
down very quickly and wealth e¤ect from labor tax increase forces consumption to go down and
labor supply to go up. With a smaller tax rate, the negative wealth e¤ect is smaller. But as
the elasticities go down, we see a persistent increase in labor supply with a slower and smaller
decline in consumption. In the new steady, consumption almost comes to the original steady
state and labor supply is signicantly above the original one, a phenomenon contrast to the
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previous SS model. However, lower labor supply by the saver(stronger, bigger actual decline)
and a higher labor supply(weaker, smaller actual increase ) makes the total labor supply behave
almost identical to the MLY case and therefore to the previous SS model, with labor supply
overshooting the MLY model in the short run and undershooting in the longrun. Both output
and investment overshoots the MLY case a bit in the short run and under shoots in the longrun.
Tax revenue lies above the MLY model in the longrun, indicating a more expansionary e¤ect
of the tax cut. However, interest payments rise above the MLY model in the longrun. As a
result. net revenue declines dramatically in the longrun, going far below the original steady state
instead of going up, a trend contrast to the previous SS model. Therefore, this SS model produces
dynamic response from the macro and scal variables which are qualitatively and quantitatively
di¤erent and for some, opposite to the any previous version of the SS model.
4.6 Impulse Response Functions of a Labor Tax cut Financed by Capital Tax
Figure 16 compares the e¤ect of a permanent cut of labor tax where the tax cut is nanced by
increasing the capital tax rate in model 1. In the OLY model, the immediate e¤ect is somewhat
di¤erent. The after tax return on labor goes up, increasing labor supply somewhat. Investment is
almost unchanged. Output increases slightly, increasing consumption. In the short run, expected
decline in after tax return on capital because of the capital tax increase dramatically reduce
investment. Reduced capital reduces output and consumption. Reduction in consumption is
compensated by an increase in leisure which lowers labor supply. Consumption, labor supply,
investment and output all go down in the new steady state. Tax and net revenue are both below
their original steady state level. MLY model shows similar pattern. The SS model also shows
similar aggregate behavior. The saver mimics the representative agents behavior again. For the
spender, we again see interesting and di¤erent behavior. Upon impact, labor supply always go
down but consumption is almost unchanged. Along the transition path, consumption falls because
of habit. Future increase in capital tax reduces capital accumulation which reduces output and
wage. Spender, therefore, is forced to increases his labor supply throughout the transition path
to the new steady state.
Figure 17 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of labor tax nanced by
capital tax in model 2. Surprisingly, this has very interesting and signicantly di¤erent e¤ect
compared to model 1. With similar decline in the labor supply upon impact, the spender increases
his labor supply lass dramatically than the previous SS model. But in the longrun the lower IES
and Frisch elasticity causes him to increase his labor at a much higher steady state. On the other
hand, the saver decreases his labor supply at a lower steady state than the previous model and
his own original steady state. Consumption for both groups takes a similar dive to a lower steady
state. In the aggregate we see a decline in the labor supply, which, with very similar movement in
investment, reduces output slightly below the MLY model. The tax revenue, after an immediate
decline, attempts to increase. But in the longrun, it takes a dramatic turn, declining further
down to a much lower steady state. Net revenue also falls below the MLY case by a smaller
margin. In model 3, we see impulse responses very similar to the MLY model, a direct contrast
to model 2.
Figure 18 compares the e¤ect of an unanticipated permanent cut of labor tax for both the
saver and the spender nanced by capital tax increase in model 4. For the saver, the labor tax cut
produces an immediate substitution e¤ect, causing labor supply and consumption to up. Aggre-
gate investment is almost unchanged upon impact and with a lower labor supply, output goes up
a bit. In the short run and also in the longrun, the negative income e¤ect from the capital tax rise
dominates everything else and we see a gradual decline in consumption and investment. Labor
supply also goes down in the steady state. Spender, on the other hand,responds immediately by
reducing labor supply while lower elasticities prevent them from substituting for consumption,
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causing it to be unchanged. In the short run, aggregate output declines as a result of declined
labor supply and investment. For the spender, the negative income from a declined wage starts
to dominate the substitution e¤ect and labor supply goes up. But with a lower elasticity and
declined income, spender is forced to reduce consumption. In the longrun, consumption goes
down even further to a much lower steady state, comparable to the previous SS model. Labor
supply goes up in the new steady state, but now smaller than the previous SS model. Total labor
supply goes down in the new steady state, but now slightly above the MLY model. Combined
with a lower investment along the transition path and in the new steady state, output goes down,
but now above the MLY case. Debt/output ratio falls below the MLY model because of the same
reason. Tax revenue stays above the MLY model, indicating a less contractionary e¤ect of the
tax cut while net tax revenue lies above the MLY case as well, reecting the same pattern. One
sees quantitative di¤erences among the SS and the MLY model, with little qualitative di¤erence.
Several important observations emerge from this section. With preference heterogeneity, we
now see qualitative and quantitative results in our heterogenous model which is signicantly
di¤erent from the representative agent model. First, preference heterogeneity amplies the con-
trasting behavior in our model, producing di¤erent results. Second, behavioral heterogeneity
not only distinguishes between the two groups, but also changes the result of the saver, who
holds a larger fraction in the model and therefore, has a larger e¤ect in the aggregate behavior.
Third, behavioral heterogeneity not only produces short run di¤erences, but also generates long
run di¤erences, which sometimes becomes more pronounced depending on which tax is cut and
which adjustment is undertaken. Overall, behavioral heterogeneity appears to be important for
dynamic and scal behavior of our macroeconomic model. After adding tax rate heterogeneity,
the SS model produces results which are not only qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent from
the representative agent model, but they are also contrasting. Model 4 e¢ ciently amplies the
contrasting behavioral di¤erence between the saver and the spender and thereby, make the dy-
namic response the macro and scal variables sometimes fundamentally di¤erent. Second, from
a policy perspective, this model highlights that some tax cut-adjustment schemes could be far
more contractionary than a representative model would predict and some expansionary schemes
could be much more expansionary. Third, this highly complicated model with its unique and
more realistic interaction between habit, elasticity and tax structure produces dynamic response
that appears to be much smoother and persistent than the representative agent model with habit
persistence alone. Overall, this model clearly establishes the need and usefulness of using a
heterogenous agent model in analysis of dynamic scal policy.
5 Quantitative Signicance of the Heterogenous Agent Model
In the previous section, we have seen that the dynamic response of the RBC model with het-
erogeneity produces results which are di¤erent from the representative agent model. But how
signicant are these di¤erences? In this section, we will try to answer this question by undertak-
ing an experiment which will calculate dynamic and static scores of capital and labor tax rate
cut under alternative nancing schemes and try to investigate how much of the tax cut nances
itself. This is the theme that has been followed in M&W. For actual policy decisions about tax
cuts, this same exercise is done by government agencies like Joint committee of taxation(1996,
2003,2005) and Congressional Budget O¢ ce(CBO,2005).
5.1 Dynamic Scoring for di¤erent tax cuts under Alternative Financing schemes
Following Joint Committee of Taxation(1996,2003), the static score for any particular tax cut
can be written as:
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Static score = ( +)  Y     Y (52)
The dynamic score can be written as:
Dynamic score = ( +)  (Y +Y )    Y (53)
For model 1, 2,3 and for the MLY, the above equation simplies to:
Static score at time t after the tax cut =

(1  )  Y  Lt
	
+

  Y  Kt
	  Tss (54)
Dynamic score at time t after the tax cut = Tt   Tss (55)
Where, Tss is the total tax revenue at the original steady state before the tax cut, dened in
(22). For model 4, the static score equation is more complicated, but could be written as:
Static score at time t after the tax cut =
"(
(1  )  FLaYL Lat
+(1  )  (1 F )LpYL 
Lp
t
)
+

  Y  Kt
	# Tss
(56)
Finally, the feedback e¤ect, the e¤ect that shows how much of the revenue impact of the tax
cut is nanced by higher growth or expansion of the tax base, is given by:
Feedback e¤ect at time t after the tax cut =

1  Dynamic Score
Static Score

 100 (57)
Therefore, the feedback e¤ect shows what percentage of the tax cut is paid for itself. Table 4
shows the dynamic feedback e¤ect of a capital tax cut nanced by alternative schemes at di¤erent
point of time along the transition path. Column 1 shows the feedback e¤ect when transfers adjust.
This is the experiment conducted by M&W. The baseline model of MLY is a discrete version of
the M&W model with habit persistence and can therefore, be compared with column 1 of table
1 in M&W. The immediate feedback e¤ect is 11.92%, 78.24 % by the 25th year and 79.54% in
the new steady state. These numbers are somewhat di¤erent from the original M&W model
because of the habit persistence and di¤erent parameter specication4, but could nevertheless be
compared. For model 1 with no heterogeneity and equal labor supply assumption, the feedback
e¤ects are 5.37%, 72.30 % and 81.62% respectively. For model 2 with preference heterogeneity but
equal labor supply assumption, the numbers are 27.93%, 116.24% and 124.23%. For model 3 with
preference heterogeneity and di¤erent labor supply assumption, the numbers are 25.91%, 83.46%
and 85.95%. Finally, for model 4 with preference and tax heterogeneity and no labor supply
restriction, the numbers are 25.31%, 60.39% and 50.19%. We notice some interesting features.
For the baseline SS model of model 1, the immediate and short run e¤ect is smaller than the
MLY model. In the longrun, the feedback e¤ect not only catches up with the MLY model, but
appears to be more expansionary in the steady state(compare 80% to 82%). For SS models with
only preference heterogeneity, the entire transition path exhibits more expansionary e¤ect of the
tax cut. However, in the SS model with both preference and tax heterogeneity, the short run and
immediate e¤ect is larger while in the new steady state, appears to be less expansionary(compare
80% to 50%). Column 2 shows the feedback e¤ect when government spending adjusts. Model 1
4By changing the value of k from 0.35 to 0.25, increasing the value of L from 20% to 34%, reducing IES of
consumption from 1 to 0.5 and assuming no habit persistence( b = o), we get the MW model specication and can
show the feedbacks are identical to their model.
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appears to be less expansionary than the MLY model. In the new steady state, model 1 shows the
feedback e¤ect is negative which means that reduction of output(tax base) contributes to 8.84% of
the revenue loss, a number comparable to the MLY model. In model 2 , the immediate and short
run feedback e¤ect indicate much more expansionary e¤ect. Within 25 years, it doubles the MLY
case. In the new steady, the feedback e¤ect is positive, indicating that capital tax cut nanced
by government spending could even be expansionary, which directly contrasts with the MLY
model. In model 3, the feedback at the immediate and short run is much more expansionary
than the MLY model(20.64% and 50.60% compared to 6.64% and 22.52%). Within 50 years,
the feedback e¤ect becomes negative, indicating a stronger contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut.
In the long run, feedback is negative and quite large(-26.42 % compared to -8.84%), indicating
that the representative model seriously underestimates the contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut
when nanced by government spending, a trend that we also observed in the previous section.
In model 4, the feedback is negative and larger in the steady state, indicating an even larger
underestimation of the contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut. Therefore, table 3 clearly indicates
the qualitative and quantitative implications of the heterogenous models when capital tax is cut.
Table 5 shows the dynamic feedback e¤ect of a labor cut nanced by alternative schemes at
di¤erent point of time along the transition path. In case of the MLY, model 1, 2 and 3, the tax cut
is a one percent reduction of labor tax which is same for all groups. In model 4, the labor tax cut
is a 1% reduction of the labor tax imposed on both the saver and the spender. Column 1 shows
the feedback e¤ect when labor tax is nanced by transfer, an experiment conducted by M&W. In
the MLY model, the immediate e¤ect is 0.41%, 12.50% by 25th year and 12.59% in the new steady
state. The immediate e¤ect is considerable smaller than the M&W, although their results could
easily be derived by changing the parameters and removing the habit persistence. The steady
state feedback e¤ect could be compared with M&W model, indicating very little role of habit in
the feedback calculations or in the long run dynamic behavior, a point highlighted in the previous
section. In model 1, the immediate feedback is negative, indicating a contractionary e¤ect which
contrasts with the MLY model. In the short run, the feedback becomes positive by 25th year. In
the new steady state, the feedback is 14.3%, almost comparable to the MLY model. In model 2,
the immediate feedback is 11.8%, quite large compared to the MLY model. In the short run, the
feedback e¤ects are noticeably higher(almost double). In the steady state, the feedback is 45.2%,
almost three times than the MLY model. In model 3, the immediate feedback is 4.3%. In the
short run and in the new steady state, the feedback is roughly 22%, almost twice the MLY model.
In model 4, the immediate e¤ect is 5.2%. In the short run, the feedback increases from almost 7%
after one year to 5.6% in the 25th year. In the next 25 year, the feedback dramatically decreases
until in the new steady state it becomes -2%, suggesting a mild contractionary e¤ect of the tax
cut where the other models suggested otherwise. This experiment suggests dramatically di¤erent
results in the SS model contingent on alternative heterogeneity. Short run e¤ects appear to be
more expansionary than the MLY model(with exception of model 1 where we see contractionary
e¤ect). In the longrun, the expansionary e¤ects are magnied even more(with the exception of
model 4, where we see contractionary e¤ects). Column 2 shows feedback e¤ect when government
spending adjusts. We see contractionary e¤ect across all the models. In the MLY model, feedback
contracts from -4.2% upon impact to -44.6% in the new steady state. In model 2 we see a
bigger immediate and short run impact(-11% and -8.8%) but smaller steady state feedback(-
43%) compared to the MLY model(-44.6%), indicating slightly less contractionary e¤ect of the
tax cut. In model 2, immediate feedback e¤ect is even positive(8.1%), indicating expansionary
e¤ect of the tax cut. In the long run, however, the feedback e¤ect contracts to -34.47% in the new
steady state, indicating a less contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut. In model 3, the immediate
e¤ect is negative but very small(-0.14%). After one year, the feedback becomes positive to 2.2%.
In the short run however, the feedback e¤ect becomes negative until it becomes -52% in the new
steady state, indicating a more contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut. In model 4, the immediate
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feedback e¤ect is -2.8%. But in the new steady state it becomes -56.55%, suggesting a much
more contractionary e¤ect of the tax cut than any other model. This experiment also shows
interesting results under di¤erent models; Short run e¤ects are dramatically mixed, ranging from
strongly contractionary to expansionary. In the longrun, feedback e¤ects consistently suggest
more contractionary e¤ect in the SS models compared to the MLY model. Column 3 shows the
feedback e¤ect when capital tax adjusts. In the MLY model, the immediate e¤ect is -9.56%,
-15% after one year, then 116.38% after 25th year and nally 102% in the new steady state.
In model 1, the immediate e¤ect is more contractionary(-16%). But in the new steady state,
the feedback appears to be very similar to the MLY model. In model 2, the immediate e¤ect
is smaller(-1%) and the longrun e¤ect is larger(103.86%). In model 3, the feedback are very
much comparable to the MLY model, an issue documented in the previous section. In model 4,
the immediate e¤ect is more contractionary(-13.16%), but the longrun feedback is comparable
to the MLY model(103%). Therefore, table 4 clearly indicates the qualitative and quantitative
importance of the heterogenous models when labor tax is cut because they provide a wide array
of di¤erent and sometimes contrasting results.
Several important observations emerge from this section. While the feedback results strengthen
our claim about the usefulness of the SS models in the dynamic calculations, they also provide
further insight into the complicated nature of the results from the tax experiments and their
dependence on the interactions between behavior of the heterogeneous groups. We notice some
general features of our quantitative results. The SS model unambiguously intensies the dynamic
behavior of the aggregate model, making experimental results more dramatic. In case of con-
tractionary policies, the SS model predicts more contractionary e¤ects than the representative
agent model. The underestimation by the representative agent model can be as high as 23% for
the capital tax cut and 8% for a labor tax cut. Similarly, when the policies are expansionary,
the SS model predicts a more expansionary e¤ect on the economy. The underestimation by the
representative agent model can be as high as 45% for the capital tax cut and 33% for a labor
tax cut. Therefore, these model highlight the importance of using heterogenous agent models
in important policy making considerations. The qualitative results from the SS also suggests a
wider menu of possible outcomes which could also be relevant for analyzing the e¢ cacy of certain
scal reforms.
6 Steady State Analysis
This section will look at the e¤ect of alternative scal policies with their various adjustment rules
on the steady state dynamics of various versions of the SS models. There are two objectives.
First, we will analytically analyze the steady state comparative statics results of the SS model and
compare those with the representative agent model. Second, we will conduct numerical exercises
to analyze the steady state e¤ects of various scal policies and their alternative adjustments.
These results will also be compared and contrasted between the SS and the MLY model.
6.1 Comparative Statics
In this section, we will derive steady state comparative results for the SS model under very
general CES utility function and CRS production function to highlight the universality of the
results obtained. Following Leeper and Yang(2006), let us dene a general production function
F (.) and express it in terms of the capital-labor ratio, k. Let
z =
k
L
; f (z) =

k
L

(58)
So,
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y = F (k; L) = Lf (z) (59)
FL (k; L) = (1  ) f (z) (60)
FL (k; L) = (1  ) f (z) (61)
Fk (k; L) = 
f (z)
z
(62)
Also dene the steady state marginal utility from consumption and labor in general notations
to be u(Ca;p (1  b)) and v(1  La;p). Then rewrite the steady state versions of equations (system
of equations can be re-written as
v(1  La) = u(Ca (1  b1)) (1  1b1)(1  La) (1  ) f (z) (63)
v(1  Lp) = u(Cp (1  b2)) (1  2b2)(1  Lp) (1  ) f (z) (64)
Also write the steady state version of equation (10)
1
1
  (1  ) = (1  K)f (z)
z
(65)
Next rewrite the aggregate resource constraint of equation (50) in terms of sG and z as
F  Ca + (1  F )Cp = L (1  sG)f (z)  z (66)
The remaining equations of the system are
(1  F )Cp = (1  Lp)(1  )(1  F )L
p
L
Y + TRp (67)
L = F  La + (1  F )  Lp (68)
TR = TRa + TRp (69)
For our scal experiments, we dene net tax revenue as
NR = TR 

Rb   1

B (70)
Axiom 1 To carry out comparative statics experiments for model 1, 2 and 3, we assume Lat =

Lp
t 8t.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption of axiom 1, the sign of @L
p
@L
is ambiguous. We see
@Lp
@L
 0 i¤ Cp  2

(1  ) (1  L)LpY
L

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Proof. See Appendix-A
Let us give the intuition for the results. The term within the parentheses on the right hand
side of the inequality is the wage income of the spender. As long as spenders consumption is
greater than a fraction of his wage income, a fraction determined by the IES for consumption,
income e¤ect would dominate the substitution e¤ect, allowing the spender to reduce labor supply
when labor tax goes up and vice versa.
Proposition 3 Under the assumption of axiom 1, the sign of @L
a
@L
is ambiguous. We see
@La
@L
 0 i¤ 1  1(1  F )(1  
L)
CaF

W (1  L)  C
L

B
A
  f(1  )Lpf (z)g

0
Where B and A are constants dened as
B =
1
2
  (1  Lp)
(1  L) +
(1  )f (z)Lp (1  Lp) 2
Cp

and
A =

1 +
(1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  Lp) 2
Cp2

Proof. See Appendix-A
Proposition 3 shows that the labor supply decisions of the saver depends on a restriction
which is a function of our models deep parameters and observed data. It is di¢ cult to provide
any economic intuition behind proposition 2 and rightfully so. For the spender, it was easier
to explain his labor supply decisions because he faces only decisions between consumption and
labor supply. Taxes e¤ect both of these decisions directly. For the saver, however, taxes have
both direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct e¤ect comes from the euler equation of labor supply.
But there is an indirect e¤ect which comes from the aggregate resource constraint where the
availability of consumption for the saver depends on how much is consumed by the spender. This
second general equilibrium e¤ect5 prevents us from analytically specifying savers labor supply
decisions. From proposition 2 and 3, it is easy to show that the sign of @L
@L
ambiguous. This
is a direct contradiction to the analytical results obtained by Leeper and Yang(2006), where the
sign of the derivatives in (79) was unambiguous, negative. Therefore it provides a glimpse to the
crucial di¤erences between the representative agent model and our heterogenous agent model.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption of axiom 1, the sign of @L
p
@TR is unambiguous. We see
@Lp
@TR
 0
Proof. See Appendix-A
Proposition 5 Under the assumption of axiom 1, the sign of @L
a
@TR is ambiguous. We see
5Papers that use complicated heterogenous models such as Imrhohoglu(1999) and Rios-Riul(1997) argues that
many of dynamic response of the agents come from interaction between them and is very di¢ cult to quantify. They
refer to these e¤ects as General Equilibrium E¤ects.
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@La
@TR
 0 i¤ (1  L
a) 1
CaF

1
(1  F )

C
L
  (1  L)W

 W (1  L)

 1
Proof. See Appendix-A
Combining proposition 4 and 5, we can easily show that the sign of @L@TR is ambiguous. This
is a direct contradiction to one of the basic results in a representative agent RBC model where
there are lump sum transfers. In representative agent model, as Leeper and Yang(2006) points
out, transfers are distributionaly neutral and non-distorting. As a result, transfers do not e¤ect
labor supply decisions. In our SS model, the spenders labor supply decision is directly e¤ected.
For the saver, transfers change the distribution of income and e¤ect their marginal labor supply
decisions as well.
Proposition 6 Under the assumption of axiom 1
@La
@SG
 0 , @L
p
@SG
= 0
Proof. See Appendix-A
From Proposition 8, we can easily show that @L
@SG
 0. This is consistent with Leeper and
Yang(2006). This is because changing government spending does not create any distributional
e¤ects. Hence the e¤ect of government spending is similar between the MLY and the SS model.
Proposition 7 In the SS model
@K
@K
 0
Proof. See Appendix-A
Proposition 9 is also consistent with Leeper and Yang(2006). This is because only the savers
accumulate capital. Capital tax e¤ects only their investment. Since the savers behave very
similar to the representative agent, the e¤ect of capital tax on capital accumulation is very
similar between the SS and MLY model.
Proposition 8 In the SS model
@K
@TR
= Ambiguous
Proof. The proof is easy and follows directly from corollary 7.
Combining Proposition 2,3,4,5,8,9 and using the denition of net revenue from equation(77),
we can easily show that the signs of @Y
@L
, @Y@TR ,
@(NR)
@L
,@(NR)@TR are all ambiguous. This again is a
direct contradiction with Leeper and Yang(2006).
6.2 Numerical Experiments
Comparative statics from the previous section point out the ambiguity of the steady state dy-
namics under alternative policy changes. In order to fully understand how policies e¤ect the
steady state dynamics, we will take our fully calibrated MLY and the SS model analyze alterna-
tive policy e¤ects. We will only use the model-3 as our chosen SS model. We could also analyze
the model-4. But the steady state dynamics become very complicated with tax heterogeneity.
Therefore, analyzing model-3 is su¢ cient to appreciate the role of heterogeneity.
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Following Leeper and Yang(2006) and using the assumption of no tax heterogeneity for model-
3, the steady state intertemporal budget constraint could be written as follows 
1   1SB = SG +STR   (1  )L  dK (71)
When we want to see the e¤ect of a capital tax cut, we set dK =  0:0035 and when we
want to see the e¤ect of labor tax cut, we set, dK =  0:0025:It is straightforward to use (78)
to compute the adjustment required in other instruments as a function of the posited change in
debt, SB. Figure 19 summarizes the relationship between the debt-output ratio and various
budgetary variables for three distorting scal adjustments under the benchmark parameter values
of table 1 when there is a 1% capital tax cut. The x-axis in each of the nine plots has debt-output
ratios in the new steady state varying from 0.376 to 1.0. The o¤setting policy used is labeled at
the y-axis of the rst row. The rst row reports the magnitudes of scal instruments in levels
in the new steady state. The second and last rows plot percent changes in the tax base and
net revenues relative to their levels in the original steady state with no tax cut and debt-output
ratio of 0.376. Similar to Leeper and Yang(2006), we see that a higher debt-output ratio in
the MLY model is associated with (1) larger required scal adjustments from, (2) less favorable
expansionary e¤ects with unchanged tax base for the transfer-adjustment case and (3) more
costly tax cuts in terms of a larger decline in the tax revenue. These results are consistent with
out previous results. A higher debt-ratio induces a larger fraction of government resources to be
devoted to debt servicing. This requires either both government and transfers to be permanently
lower or labor tax to be permanently higher. All of the above adjustments, as pointed out in
section 3, has contractionary e¤ects . Larger adjustments will have larger distortions, forcing a
larger decline in both tax base and net revenue. In the SS, model however, the picture is di¤erent.
Government spending adjustment and labor tax increase appears to be less contractionary, partly
because of a favorable labor supply response from the spender as was explained in section. The
net revenue also appears to be decreasing less. When transfers adjust, we see very contrasting
response between the MLY and the SS model. In the MLY model, transfers have no e¤ect on
the tax base. In the SS model, a decline in the transfers creates a negative wealth e¤ect which
forces the spenders to increase their labor supply, causing an expansion of the tax base. With
unfavorable movement in the interest rate, the net revue also goes down, but now signicantly
smaller than the MLY model. Figure 20 summarizes the relationship between the debt-output
ratio and various budgetary variables for three distorting scal adjustments under the benchmark
parameter values of table 1 when there is a 1% labor tax cut. Very similar picture emerge in this
case with tax base decreasing less than the MLY model and appearing to be expansionary when
transfers adjust. The net revenue appears to be decreasing less under all adjustments.
7 Conclusions
As Leeper and Yang(2006) pointed out, dynamic scoring is a complex business. This paper
has made a vigorous attempt to enrich our understanding of the complex e¤ect of various scal
policies. From our viewpoint, this paper has made several contribution to the existing literature.
First, we have developed a modied version of the savers-spenders model which could provide a
unied framework that could be used to study both the aggregate and distributional aspects of
scal policy. Second, we have expanded Leeper and Yang(2006)s study of the dynamic impact
of various tax cuts under alternative nancing schemes in a heterogenous agent environment.
Our study indicates that the dynamic aggregate response of the heterogenous agent model di¤ers
from the aggregate response of their representative agent model quantitatively and sometimes
qualitatively. Third, we have extended Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2005), Joint Committee of
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Taxation(2005) and Mankiw and Weinzierl(2006)s approach to dynamic scoring calculation with
a much broader menu of policies and have shown that there could be signicant quantitative and
even qualitative di¤erence between our calculations and theirs. Finally, by using a convenient
yet restricted heterogenous agent model, we have shown the relative importance of adopting a
dynamic approach to tax/debt burden analysis which has not yet been extensively studied in the
literature, but deserves fullest attention. Future work could look at the distributional aspects of
the dynamic scal policy with much greater detail. But the message of the paper is clear; It is
essential to use macroeconomic models which entail some degree of realistic heterogeneity among
its agents for the important purpose of policy making as well to carry out meaningful research.
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Appendix-A
Proof of Proposition 2
Under assumption 1, The steady state system in section is as follows
f (z) =

k
L

(a.1)
so that
y = F (k; L) = Lf (z) (a.2)
FL (k; L) = (1  ) f (z) (a.3)
W = FL (k; L) = (1  ) f (z) (a.4)
r = Fk (k; L) = 
f (z)
z
(a.5)
v(1  La) = u(Ca (1  b1)) (1  1b1)(1  L) (1  ) f (z) (a.6)
v(1  Lp) = u(Cp (1  b2)) (1  2b2)(1  L) (1  ) f (z) (a.7)
Also write the steady state version of equation (10)
1
1
  (1  ) = (1  K)f (z)
z
(a.8)
Next rewrite the aggregate resource constraint of equation (50) in terms of sG and z as
C = F  Ca + (1  F )Cp = L (1  sG)f (z)  z (a.9)
The remaining equations of the system are
(1  F )Cp = (1  F )(1  )(1  L)Lpf (z) + TRp (a.10)
L = F  La + (1  F )  Lp (a.11)
TR = TRa + TRp (a.12)
Total di¤erentiating (a.6) and simplifying,
dLa =
  (1  )u(Ca (1  b1)) (1  1b1)f (z)	
fv(1  La)g
"
 1
(1  L)d
L +
f(z)
f (z)
dz +
u(:) (1  b1)
u(:)
dCa
#
(a.14)
Now
f(z) =
f (z)
z
(a.15)
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Substituting (a.15) and multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the RHS of (a.14)
by (1  La) and also making use of (a.6), (a.14) could be written as
dLa =
v(:)
(1  La) v(:)
  (1  La)
(1  L) d
L +
(1  La)
z
dz +
u(:) (1  b1)
u(:)
dCa

(a.16)
Now
1
1
=
 v(:)
(1  La) v(:) = IES for leisure of the saver (a.17)
and
1 =
 u(:) (1  b1)Ca
u(:)
= IES for consumption of the saver (a.18)
Using (a.17) and (a.18), equation (a.16) can be rewritten:
dLa =
1
1
  (1  La)
(1  L) d
L +
(1  La)
z
dz   (1  L
a) 1
Ca
dCa

(a.19)
Similarly for the spender, we can get
dLp =
1
2
  (1  Lp)
(1  L) d
L +
(1  Lp)
z
dz   (1  L
p) 2
Cp
dCp

(a.20)
Total di¤erentiating ARC, equation(a.9)
F  dCa + (1  F )dCp = (1  sG)f (z)  z dL (a.21)
+L
h
(1  sG)f(z)  
i
dz   Lf (z) dsG
Total di¤erentiating budget constraint of the spender, equation(a.10)
dCp = (1  )(1  L)f (z) dLp + (1  )(1  Lp)Lpf(z) dz (a.22)
 (1  )Lpf (z) dL + dTR
p
(1  F )
Substitute (a.22) into (a.20) and re-arrange
A
dLp
z }| {
1 +
(1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  Lp) 2
Cp2

=
Bz }| {
1
2
  (1  Lp)
(1  L) +
(1  )f (z)Lp (1  Lp) 2
Cp

dL(1)
+
C_Cz }| {
1
2
"
(1  Lp)
z
  (1  )f
(z)Lp (1  Lp) 2
Cp
#
dz
 
Dz }| {
(1  Lp) 2
2Cp(1  F )

dTRp (a.23)
From (a.20) we see
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@dLp
dL
=
B
A
(A.24)
So,
@dLp
dL
 0 i¤ B
A
 0 (A.25)
The denominator, A, is positive. So the sign of @dL
p
dL
depends on the numerator. So
@dLp
dL
 0 i¤ B  0
) i¤ 1
2

(1  Lp)
(1  L)  
(1  )f (z)Lp (1  Lp) 2
Cp

 0
) i¤ Cp  2(1  L)(1  )f (z)Lp
Using equation(a.2) on the right hand side, the inequality could be written as
) @dL
p
dL
 0 i¤ Cp  2(1  L)(1  )
Y
L
Lp
Proof of Proposition 3
Substitute (a.22) into (a.21)
F  dCa = (1  sG)f (z)  z dL (a.26)
+L
h
(1  sG)f(z)  
i
dz   Lf (z) dsG
 (1  F )

(1  )(1  L)f (z) dLp
+(1  )(1  Lp)Lpf(z) dz   (1  )Lpf (z) dL

  dTRp
Also from (a.11)
dL = F  dLa + (1  F )  dLp (a.27)
substituting (a.24) and Re-organizing
F  dCa = (1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )dLp (a.28)
+
h
L
n
(1  sG)f(z)  
o
  (1  F )(1  )(1  Lp)Lpf(z)	i dz
+ f(1  F )(1  )Lpf (z)g dL   fLf (z)g dsG   dTRp
+

F

(1  sG)f (z)  z	 dLa
Substituting (a.20) into (a.23) and reorganizing,
F  dCa =
 
(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )BA
+ f(1  F )(1  )Lpf (z)g

dL (a.30)
+
" 
(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )C_CA
  L(1  sG)f(z)  	  (1  F )(1  )(1  Lp)Lpf(z)	
#
dz
 

(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )D
A
+ 1

dTRp
 fLf (z)g dsG + F (1  sG)f (z)  z	 dLa
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Substituting (a.25) into (a.19) and reorganizing,
Ez }| {
1 +
(1  La) 1
1CaF

F

(1  sG)f (z)  z		dLa (a.32)
=
Gz }| {
1
1
  (1  La)
(1  L)  
(1  La) 1
CaF
 
(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )BA
+ f(1  F )(1  )Lpf (z)g

dL
+
Hz }| {
1
1
24(1  La)
z
  (1  L
a) 1
CaF
8<:
24 (1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )C_CA
+

L

(1  sG)f(z)  	
 (1  F )(1  )(1  Lp)Lpf(z)	
 359=;
35dz
+
Mz }| {
1
1

(1  La) 1
CaF

(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )D
A
+ 1

dTRp
+
X_Xz }| {
1
1

(1  La) 1
CaF
fLf (z)g

dsG
Simplifying
dLa =
G
E
dL +
H
E
dz +
M
E
dTRp +
X_X
E
dsG (a.33)
From (a.27), we see
@La
@L
 0 i¤ G
E
 0 (a.34)
From (a.27), we see the denominator E is a positive number. Therefore
@La
@L
 0 i¤ G  0
) 1
1

(1  La)
(1  L) +
(1  La) 1
CaF
 
(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) (1  F )BA
+ f(1  F )(1  )Lpf (z)g

 0
) 1
(1  L) +
1(1  F )
CaF
 
(1  sG)f (z)  z   (1  )(1  L)f (z) BA
+ f(1  )Lpf (z)g

 0
After substituting values from (a.9) and (a.4), we see
@La
@L
 0 i¤ 1  1(1  F )(1  
L)
CaF

W (1  L)  C
L

B
A
  f(1  )Lpf (z)g

0
Proof of Proposition 5
From (a.20) , we see that spenders labor supply only gets e¤ected by their only transfers.
Therefore, we can write
@Lp
@TR
=
@Lp
@TRp
@TRp
@TR
=
@Lp
@TRp
:1 (a.35)
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Substituting from (a.20)
@Lp
@TR
=
D
A
Since A is a positive constant and D is a negative one, we can unambiguously write
@Lp
@TR
 0
Proof of Proposition 6
From (a.32), we see
@La
@TR
=
@La
@TRp
@TRp
@TR
=
@Lp
@TRp
:1
Substituting the value of @L
p
@TRp
@La
@TR
=
M
E
We see that E is unambiguously positive. Therefore substituting values from (a.2), (a.4) and
(a.9) and also values of D and A from (a.23) and re-organizing we can show
@La
@TR
 0 i¤ (1  L
a) 1
CaF

1
(1  F )

C
L
  (1  L)W

 W (1  L)

 1
Proof of Proposition 8
From (a.23), we can readily see that @L
p
@SG
= 0. Again, from From (a.33) we see that both
X_X and E are positive constants. Therefore,
@Lp
@SG
 0
Combining the above two results, we can easily see that, @L
@SG
 0.
Proof of Proposition 9
Total di¤erentiate (a.8), the euler equation for capital

(  1)(1  K) f (z)
K  z

dK +

(1  )(1  K) f (z)
L  z

dL 

f (z)
z

dK = 0 (a.36)
From (a.36), it is clear that
@K
@K
=
n
f(z)
z
o
n
(  1)(1  K) f(z)Kz
o  0
This is because the numerator is positive while the denominator is negative.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.36 STR 0.07 L 0.2
1 = 2 0.96 S
TRa 0:7  STR La 0.25
V 0.70 STRp 0:3  STR Lp 0.096
1 = 2 1 S
G 0.2 K 0.35
b1 = b2 0.6 SC 0.63 F 0.60
1 = 2 1 SB 0.17 a 2.721
 0.1 p 2.543
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter values
Model Features Assumptions
Model 1 No preference Heterogeneity 1 = 2 = 1,1 = 2 = 1; 
a = p = 2:721
Equal labor supply La = Lp = 0:2
No Tax Heterogeneity La = Lp = L = 0:25
Model 2 Yes preference Heterogeneity 1 = 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 
a = 2:721; p = 2:543
Equal labor supply La = Lp = 0:2
No Tax Heterogeneity La = Lp = L = 0:25
Model 3 Yes preference Heterogeneity 1 = 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 
a = 2:721; p = 2:543
No equal labor supply Flexible labor supply
No Tax Heterogeneity La = Lp = L = 0:25
Model 4 Yes preference Heterogeneity 1 = 2 = 1; 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 
a = 2:721; p = 2:543
No equal labor supply Flexible labor supply
Yes Tax Heterogeneity La = 0:25; Lp = 0:096
Table 2: Specication for model 1, 2, 3, 4. Unless mentioned in the table, the rest of the
parameters in table 1 would be valid
Adjustment Parameter Values
K =  1% La = Lp = L =  1%
qG  0:119  0:130
qK 0:206
qTRa  0:341  0:371
qTRp  0:341  0:371
qLa 0:149
qLp 0:149
Table 3: Fiscal Adjustment Parameters under various policy rules
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Models Time Horizon Fiscal Adjustment
Transfers Government Spending Labor Tax
Baseline Model Immediate Impact 11.92 6.64 13.75
1 year 15.24 7.92 16.30
25 year 78.40 25.97 42.02
50 year 79.53 7.24 61.15
Steady State 79.54 -8.84 70.71
Model 1 Immediate Impact 5.37 2.04 8.55
1 year 7.62 2.82 9.47
25 year 72.30 22.52 44.68
50 year 78.03 6.23 61.61
Steady State 81.62 -8.22 70.64
Model 2 Immediate Impact 27.93 23.75 30.57
1 year 31.03 25.19 33.89
25 year 116.24 50.60 46.63
50 year 120.89 25.55 70.38
Steady State 124.23 4.65 79.85
Model 3 Immediate Impact 25.91 20.64 31.22
1 year 27.36 20.28 33.50
25 year 83.46 19.66 48.14
50 year 85.26 -5.62 67.37
Steady State 85.95 -26.42 76.31
Model 4 Immediate Impact 25.31 16.24 36.12
1year 25.79 15.12 38.11
25 year 60.39 9.19 46.70
50 year 57.45 -12.00 68.82
Steady State 50.19 -31.62 80.87
Table 4: Dynamic Feedback e¤ect along the transition path of Capital tax cut while others
adjust. Column 3-5 shows percent of static revenue impact o¤set by higher growth.
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Models Time Horizon Fiscal Adjustment
Transfers Government Spending Capital Tax
Baseline Model Immediate Impact 0.41 -4.23 -9.56
1 year 3.23 -3.20 -14.97
25 year 12.50 -25.01 116.38
50 year 12.59 -36.77 104.79
Steady State 12.59 -44.59 102.14
Model 1 Immediate Impact -8.54 -11.10 -15.96
1 year -4.71 -8.88 -21.46
25 year 6.98 -27.50 116.73
50 year 11.17 -36.77 104.87
Steady State 14.26 -42.91 102.17
Model 2 Immediate Impact 11.83 8.11 -1.08
1 year 17.49 11.97 -2.77
25 year 40.06 -8.42 118.47
50 year 43.03 -24.12 106.95
Steady State 45.15 -34.47 103.85
Model 3 Immediate Impact 4.40 -0.14 -7.87
1 year 8.74 2.26 -11.66
25 year 21.12 -25.71 116.50
50 year 22.05 -41.69 105.17
Steady State 22.68 -52.02 102.48
Model 4 Immediate Impact 5.26 -2.81 -13.16
1year 6.98 -2.59 -20.14
25 year 5.69 -32.02 118.82
50 year 1.70 -46.70 106.14
Steady State -2.10 -56.53 103.22
Table 5: Dynamic Feedback e¤ect along the transition path of Labor tax cut while others
adjust. Column 3-5 shows percent of static revenue impact o¤set by higher growth.
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Figure 1:Response to Capital Tax Shock:Transfers Adjust(Model 1)
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Figure 1:Model 1. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in
capital tax cut nanced by Lump-sum transfers to both the saver and the spender. Dotted
line - SS model; the solid line - MLY model; dotted-dashed - OLY model.
Figure 2:Response to Capital Tax Shock:Tranfers Adjust(Model 2)
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Figure 2:Model 2. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Transfer experi-
ment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
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Figure 3:Response to Capital Tax Shock:Tranfers Adjust(Model 4)
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Figure 3: Model 4. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Transferexperiment.
Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 4:Response to Labor Tax Shock:Transfers Adjust(Model 1)
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Figure 4: Model 1, the baseline SS model with no preference or tax heterogeneity. Figure
analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in labor tax cut nanced by Lump-
sum transfers to both the saver and the spender. Dotted line - SS model; the solid line - MLY
model; dotted-dashed - OLY model.
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Figure 5:Response to labor Tax Shock:Tranfers Adjust(Model 2)
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Figure 5: Model 2. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a Labor tax-Transfer exper-
iment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 6:Response to Labor Tax Shock:Tranfers Adjust(Model 4)
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Figure 6:Model 4.Figure analyzes the impulse response of a Labor tax-Transfer experi-
ment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
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Figure 7:Response to Capital Tax Shock:Govt Spending adjust(Model 1)
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Figure 7:Model 1. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in
Capital tax cut nanced by Government spending . Dotted line - SS model; the solid line -
MLY model; dotted-dashed - OLY model.
Figure 8:Response to capital Tax Shock:Govt Spending adjust(Model 2)
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.5
1
1.5
I
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
N
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
Output/Tax Base
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
Debt/Output
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.4
-0.2
0
Tax Revenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
Rk
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
Interestpayment
0 20 40 60 80 100
-2
-1
0
NetRevenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
W
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
p
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.5
1
K
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
N
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.1
0
0.1
N
p
Figure 8:Model 2. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Spending exper-
iment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
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Figure 9:Response to capital Tax Shock:Govt spending adjust(Model 3)
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Figure 9:Model 3. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Spending exper-
iment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 10:Response to capital Tax Shock:Govt spending adjust(Model 4)
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Figure 10: Model 4. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Spending
experiment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
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Figure 11:Response to Labor Tax Shock:Government spending adjust(Model 1)
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Figure 11:Model 1. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in
Labor tax cut nanced by Government spending . Dotted line - SS model; the solid line -
MLY model; dotted-dashed - OLY model.
Figure 12:Response to Labor Tax Shock:Govt Spending Adjust(Model 2)
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Figure 12: Model 2. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Labor tax-Spending exper-
iment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
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Figure 13:Response to Labour Tax Shock:Govt Spending Adjust(Model 4)
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Figure 13:Model 4. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Labor tax-Spending experi-
ment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 14:Response to Capital Tax Shock:Labor Tax adjus(Model 1)
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Figure 14:Model 1. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in
Capital tax cut nanced by Labor tax. Dotted line - SS model; the solid line - MLY model;
dotted-dashed - OLY model.
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Figure 15:Response to capital Tax Shock:Labor Tax Adjusts(Model 4)
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
1
2
I
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
N
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
Output/Tax Base
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
Debt/Output
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
Tax Revenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
0
0.2
Rk
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
Interestpayment
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.4
-0.2
0
NetRevenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
W
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
p
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.5
1
K
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
N
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.1
0
0.1
N
p
Figure 15:Model 4. Figure analyzes the impulse response of Capital tax-Labor tax ex-
periment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 16:Response to Labor Tax Shock:Capital Tax adjust(Model 1)
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Figure 16:Model 1. Figure analyzes the impulse response of a permanent 1% decline in
Labor tax cut nanced by Capital tax. Dotted line - SS model; the solid line - MLY model;
dotted-dashed - OLY model.
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Figure 17:Response to labor Tax Shock:Capital tax adjust(Model 2)
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Figure 17:Model 2. Figure analyzes the impulse response of labor tax-capital tax exper-
iment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
Figure 18:Response to Labour Tax Shock:capital tax Adjust(Model 4)
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
C
0 20 40 60 80 100
-5
0
5
I
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
0
0.2
N
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
Output/Tax Base
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
Debt/Output
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.4
-0.2
0
Tax Revenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.02
0
0.02
Rk
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
Interestpayment
0 20 40 60 80 100
-2
-1
0
NetRevenue
0 20 40 60 80 100
-2
0
2
W
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5
0
0.5
C
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-1
0
1
C
p
0 20 40 60 80 100
-5
0
5
K
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
0
0.2
N
a
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.1
0
0.1
N
p
Figure 18:Model 4.Figure analyzes the impulse response of labor tax-capital tax experi-
ment. Dotted line - SS model; solid line - MLY model.
45
Response to Capital Tax
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Figure 19:Steady state Analysis.Figure plots the steady state response of a permanent
1% Capital tax rate cut. Solid line - MLY model; Dashed line-SS model. First column-govt
consumption adjusts; second column-labor tax adjusts;third column-transfers adjust. Fiscal in-
struments are in levels.; tax base and net revenue are percent changes relative to pre-tax cut
steady states.
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Figure20: Figure plots the steady stater esponse of a permanent 1% labor tax rate cut.
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